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PROTEST BOYCOTTS AS RESTRAINTS OF
TRADE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT:
A PROPOSED STANDARD
FRANCIS M. ALLEGRA*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT' WAS ORIGINALLY ENACTED to combat
trusts'- powerful business combinations, capable of wielding con-
centrated economic power-created when individual shareholders from
various corporations transferred their shares to a single trustee or
governing board.' In pertinent part, section 1 of the Sherman Act states
that "[elvery contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States .... is declared to be il-
legal."' The comprehensive language of section 1, though subsequently
limited in its scope,5 evinces a congressional intent to utilize the plenary
power of the Commerce Clause to its fullest extent.' Yet, while the
broad language was designed to preserve economic freedom and unfet-
* Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Claims, Washington, D.C.; Assoc. (on
leave), Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., Borromeo College of
Ohio; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (cur-
rent version codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
2 See 1 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 8-13 (1978).
' See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911):
[Tihe main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was
required by the economic conditions of the times, that is, the vast ac-
cumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the
enormous development of corporate organization, the facility for com-
bination which such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was
being used, and that combinations known as trusts were being
multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had been
and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public
generally.
Id. at 50.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
The Supreme Court, looking to the common law basis of the antitrust laws,
has held that only unreasonable or undue restraints of trade are unlawful. This is
commonly referred to as the "Rule of Reason" approach. See Board of Trade of
City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of N.J.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911).
' See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398
(1978); United States v. Southern Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944); see generally American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Mandeville Island Farmers,
Inc., 195 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
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tered competition,7 it has instead sometimes been used as a weapon
against individuals organizing to promote their political, social or
religious views.8
One of the most prominent recent developments in antitrust litigation
has been the increased use of the Sherman Act against protest
boycotts.' Protest boycotts are concerted refusals to deal motivated by
noncommercial objectives." These boycotts have been employed by civil
rights groups,1 consumers, 2 religious leaders 3 and political activists."
The attractive characteristic of a protest boycott is its ability to convey
a message. It is primarily a means of expression whereby the collective
economic power of a number of individuals is brought to bear to in-
fluence change. When the precept of section 1 of the Sherman Act is ap-
plied to these boycotts, an apparent conflict arises between the an-
titrust laws and the protections afforded by the first amendment. 15 An-
titrust regulation conceivably impinges on the constitutional protection
7 E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 338 (1963); Nor-
thern Pac. Railroad v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
8 See generally Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted
Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247; Silbey, Direct Action and the Struggle for
Integration, 16 HASTINGs L.J. 351 (1965); Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a
Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 705 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Coons].
I See Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S 842 (1980); Council for Employment and Economic Energy
Use v. WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1978);
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978); Osborn v. Pennnsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del.
1980); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass.
1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.),
rev'd on procedural grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of these
cases see Part III infra.
10 Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d at 1314; Allied
Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. at 338. A noncommercial ob-
jective is one unrelated to the production of business profit. See note 98 infra.
11 E.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 821 (1970) (boycott of investment firm allegedly discriminating in its financ-
ing policies); Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. A.G. Corp., 241
So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970) (boycott of grocery store allegedly discriminating in its
hiring practices).
12 E.g., Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 259 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (boycott of bakery because of its high-priced goods).
" E.g., Kuryer Publishing Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916)
(boycott of newspaper as containing heretical statements).
', E.g., Council of Defense v. Int'l Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920)
(boycott of Hearst publications thought to be undermining the war effort).
Numerous examples of boycotts are illustrated in Coons, supra note 8, at 713-26.
" The first amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[Vol. 30:221
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attaching not only to the expressive component of the boycott itself, but
also to the activities which usually accompany a boycott, such as
distributing leaflets, holding rallies and advertising."
In attempting to resolve this apparent conflict, judges and commen-
tators have sought to exempt certain protest boycotts from the an-
titrust laws. These implied exemptions 7 fall into two categories: those
predicated upon the first amendment,18 and those based on a statutory
construction of the Sherman Act. 9 They are all extensions of a doctrine
originally formulated by the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,"0 and United Mine
Workers v. Pennington." These exemptions have been cast as affir-
mative defenses available to defendants to rebut prima facie evidence of
an antitrust violation."
There are several drawbacks in using these exemptions. First, the
scope of the protection they afford is constantly being narrowed"
because, in antitrust law, there is a presumption against such implied
exemptions.24 Second, the application of these exemptions has not yield-
ed a clear standard by which future contemplated boycotts may be
evaluated in terms of their potential for generating antitrust liability."
This failure to assure consistent evaluation of similar actions may cause
others to refrain from organizing what would be legal protest boycotts.
2 6
16 See generally Robinson, Reconciling Antitrust and the First Amendment,
48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1335 (1979).
17 Implied exemptions are court-created, and as such should be contrasted-
with antitrust exemptions specifically granted by Congress. For an example of a
statutory exemption see 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1973) (Clayton Act-labor exemption).
'8 E.g., Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d at 1319.
19 See generally Coons, supra note 8; Fischel, Antitrust Liability for At-
tempts to Influence Government Action" The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 94-96 (1977).
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
21 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See Part III infra.
' Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258,
1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 586 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1978).
E.g., Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers, 499 F. Supp.
553, 557-58 (D. Del. 1980). See notes 125-36 infra and accompanying text.
24 Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S 389, 399 (1978); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963); see also California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
' See Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, 620 F.2d at 1324 (dissenting
opinion of Gibson, J.).
' The situation is akin to that of a statute having a "chilling effect" on the ex-
ercise of first amendment rights. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
The absence of a clear standard enhances the threat of an antitrust suit, and this
threat as such may be enough to discourage the use of a protest boycott. See
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Third, and most important, in using these exemptions the courts have
avoided deciding the threshold issue of whether these protests are in
fact anticompetitive. This determination is crucial, for if protest
boycotts do not violate the Sherman Act, no implied exemption is
necessary.
Alternate theories for evaluating protest boycotts must be developed.
A recent Note" advocates the use of the Rule of Reason28 for analyzing
protest boycotts. The Pennsylvanian authors suggest that the noncom-
mercial purpose underlying a protest boycott should be weighed as a
factor in determining its reasonableness.29 This paper will maintain that
genuine protest boycotts are not anticompetitive because they do not
restrict the economic freedom of either the participants or the boycot-
ted entity; nor are they used to enforce an anticompetitive practice,
such as collusion or horizontal exclusion. In Part II, cases dealing with
unilateral and concerted refusals to deal will be examined to determine
under which circumstances refusals to deal are illegal. Part III will
analyze two recent protest boycotts cases: Crown Central Petroleum v.
Waldman,3' and Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Service Station.2 The
legal standards used in these cases will be rejected in Part IV as
superfluous, and a clearer standard will be presented for determining
the legality of protest boycotts.
II. BOYCOTTS AND REFUSALS TO DEAL: A PERSPECTIVE
A. Some Definitions and Preliminary Case Law
A refusal to deal with another economic actor, standing alone, does
not violate the antitrust laws but may be subject to antitrust interdic-
tion if it is employed to effectuate an otherwise anticompetitive course
of conduct.3 The refusal to deal is merely a self-help mechanism, which
can be used as a tool by one or more parties to enforce a practice. 4 If
the practice enforced is an anticompetitive one, such as price fixing or
horizontal exclusion, then the refusal to deal, as a component of the
overall scheme, is also illegal." Where the practice enforced is per se il-
? Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Protest Boycotts].
' See note 5 supra.
2 Protest Boycotts, supra note 27, at 1157-61.
10 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
"' 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
32 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980).
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the An-
titrust Laws 137 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Report].
3'4 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207 (1976).
31 See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918).
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legal, the refusal will be per se illegal;" if the practice is examined
under the Rule of Reason, so also will the refusal. 7 Thus, refusals to
deal function like "economic chameleons," their treatment and legality
being determined by the actions with which they are associated.
1. Unilateral Refusals to Deal
Initially, a distinction must be drawn between unilateral or individual
refusals to deal and concerted or group refusals to deal. A unilateral
refusal to deal is defined as a severing of economic ties by a single party; a
concerted refusal to deal is the product of several parties collectively
agreeing not to deal with a selected economic actor. 8 Unilateral refusals
to deal can further be divided into two categories: simple unilateral
refusals to deal and non-simple unilateral refusals. Simple unilateral
refusals to deal derive from the independent judgment of an economic
actor, and do not involve coercive enforcement or other parties.39 Non-
simple unilateral refusals implicate other economic actors, usually as ac-
cessories in a complex policing plan." Concerted, simple unilateral and
non-simple unilateral refusals to deal each have been the target of an-
titrust litigation.
The Supreme Court made its first definitive statements concerning
the legality of simple unilateral refusals to deal in United States v. Col-
gate Co.4" In Colgate, the defendant announced a resale price policy and
terminated economic relations with those distributors who would not
subscribe to it.4" In its indictment, the government alleged that Colgate
had unlawfully created and engaged in a combination, the purpose of
which was to procure adherence on the part of distributors to the resale
policy. 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
indictment for failure to allege an agreement between the distributors
3 E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
" E.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Hennessey
v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
A single party's refusal to deal, which utilizes other economic actors in its
enforcement, is nevertheless labeled a unilateral refusal to deal. See E. KINTNER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 10.19, at 130 n.342 (2d ed. 1971).
N E.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
4' E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (other parties
used as informants in enforcing price maintenance program).
'1 250 U.S. 300 (1919). An earlier Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915),
had upheld a defendant's decision to discontinue sales to plaintiffs retail outlets.
42 250 U.S. at 303.
'3 Id. at 302-03.
19811
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and Colgate." Additionally, the Court declared that a trader or manufac-
turer had the right to use independent discretion in determining with
whom it would deal.'5
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have discounted any intention
on the part of the Colgate Court to give a blanket sanction to all refusals
to deal." Colgate merely stands for the proposition that absent an
agreement between a supplier and its distributors, a price maintenance
program is not illegal, and consequently, a simple unilateral refusal to
deal used to enforce such a maintenance program is also not illegal.
Beginning with United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 7 the Supreme
Court began to imply the necessary agreement from the conduct of the
parties. 8 Once an agreement is inferred, pointing to the existence of
either a contract, combination or conspiracy, a price maintenance pro-
gram will fall as a violation of the Sherman Act. 9 A corresponding label
of illegality will be placed on any unilateral refusal to deal subsumed in
such a program.
" Id. at 306-07. Absent a "contract, combination .... or conspiracy," there
could be no violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See note 4 supra and accompany-
ing text.
4' 250 U.S. at 307. The Supreme Court stated what has become known as the
Colgate doctrine:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
[Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.
And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under
which he will refuse to sell.
Id. See generally Comment, The Colgate Doctrine: Its Past and Present, 12
HOUSTON L. REV. 409 (1975); Note, Dealer Recovery for Unreasonable Refusals to
Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 720 (1968).
4" United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944); FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922); United States v. A. Schrader's
Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1920). See also Comment, Unilateral Refusals to
Dea" King Colgate is Dead!, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (1969).
"7 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
48 See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964). In FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), the Court implied a combination from the com-
plex procedure used by Beech-Nut to identify and isolate wholesalers and
retailers not conforming to its resale policy. Other retailers and wholesalers were
used as informants, aiding in the preparation of blacklists. Id. at 448-49. See also
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
" Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 650-58 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 573-75 (4th
Cir. 1963). See generally Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (program to
hold down price of newspapers held to be illegal conspiracy between newspaper
and replacement distributor).
m Id.
[Vol. 30:221
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Non-simple unilateral refusals to deal are unilateral refusals em-
bodied in practices which are anticompetitive. In addition to lending
themselves to compel support for resale price maintenance programs,
non-simple unilateral refusals to deal have been utilized to implement
market allocation schemes,51 tying arrangements52 and attempts to
monopolize. The more restrictive treatment of these refusals results
from the courts' sensitivity to the use of coercive economic power to
restrain commercial freedom. While in non-simple refusals only one
economic actor is actually severing or threatening to sever relations,
other economic actors, usually competitors or direct suppliers of the
target, combine their economic power with the principal actor to but-
tress the coercive potential of the refusal.54 Via this combination, the
commercial impact of the refusal is brought home to the target, making
it easier to convince him to accede to the demands of the refusing party.
2. Concerted Refusals to Deal
It is not surprising, given the judicial attention paid to coercive uses
of economic power, that most case law in the refusal area centers on
concerted refusals to deal. A concerted or group refusal to deal is the
end result of several parties collectively agreeing not to deal with a
selected economic actor. It is brought into existence by a boycott.5 A
boycott is an explicit or implied agreement among actors to deprive
1 E.g., Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976). In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977), the defendant manufacturer included a provision in its franchise
agreements barring its retailers from selling franchised products from locations
other than those detailed in the contracts. Id. at 42. The Supreme Court held that
the vertical territorial market allocation arrangement was not a per se violation,
and that it, as well as the refusal to deal designed to enforce it, should be judged
using the Rule of Reason approach. Id. at 59. The case is yet another example of a
refusal to deal being judged under the same legal standard applied to the larger
anticompetitive course of conduct of which it is a part.
5 E.g., Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
" E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 354 U.S. 594 (1953);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
, For example, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), the
defendant manufacturer enlisted the aid of its wholesalers in forcing retailers to
conform to its minimum resale price policy. Id. at 33. Parke, Davis & Co. also in-
formed noncomplying retailers that their competitors would be able to continue
selling the defendant's popular line of cosmetics by virtue of their agreement to
the policy. Id. at 33-36.
1 The term "boycott" derives from an action taken against one Captain
Boycott, a British land agent, who paid his tenant farmers starvation wages and
evicted those who protested. The farmers solicited the support of Boycott's other
employees, who promptly ceased relations with the captain. See WEBSTER'S
THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 264 (1971).
1981]
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another party or parties of some trade relationship.,
There are two types of boycotts: primary and secondary. In a primary
boycott, parties at one level of the production or distribution chain57
agree to sever economic ties with an actor at another level or to deal on-
ly on certain terms. These boycotts are often employed to coerce the ac-
ceptance of some sales condition or business policy desired by the
boycotting parties. 8 For example, a group of raw material suppliers
might agree to refuse to deal with any manufacturer who does not sign
a standard requirements contract. Frequently, a primary boycott is an
unobserved component of some other anticompetitive activity, such as
price-fixing59 or horizontal exclusion. As a result, it is not often analyzed
as a boycott, but rather is treated under the legal standard applied to
the larger violative course of conduct of which it is a part.61
Secondary boycotts have more readily been identified by the courts
as autonomous anticompetitive acts. In a secondary boycott, a group of
competitors at one commercial level extends its economic influence
through the conscription of otherwise neutral suppliers or customers,
who are forced to discontinue their economic relations with a competitor
of the boycotting group.2 For example, a group of retailers may
threaten a wholesaler with the loss of their business to force it, in turn,
to refuse to deal with a competing retailer. In this instance, the
5 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 83, at 230 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as L. SULLIVAN].
" These parties could be consumers, manufacturers, distributors or retailers.
E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951) (distillers refused to sell to wholesalers who would not resell at prices fixed
by Seagram); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930)
(film distributors agreed not to deal with any exhibitor who refused to sign a
standard contract). An example of a primary protest boycott would be the con-
sumer boycott of J.P. Stevens & Co. goods in response to that company's anti-
union practices. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1978, at 20, col. 6.
" E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951).
o E.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) (agreement
among defendant film distributors not to deal with exhibitors who would not
lease films from all the distributors).
61 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at § 90.
62 E.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
Secondary boycotts can even exist on an international plane. The relatively re-
cent Arab boycott of foreign countries which traded with Israel is one example.
See Note, The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of United States v.
Bechtel in Light of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 144 (1979).
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See also
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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economic freedom of the wholesaler is restrained because it cannot sell
to the targeted retailer, and the economic freedom of the retailer is
likewise restrained because it cannot buy from the wholesaler.
In a secondary group boycott there is a pooling of economic power to
impose a horizontal restraint, which purpose might be to exclude com-
petitors, 4 maintain oligopolistic market conditions 5 or coerce conform-
ity to unreasonable trade practices." A group boycott is primarily used
to fend off competition from a nonparticipating horizontal competitor,
either by eliminating that competitor or compelling it to compete less
fervently."
Unlike a unilateral refusal to deal, a secondary boycott, when present
in a course of conduct, is rarely overlooked by the courts. Despite the
fact that a secondary group boycott is usually afforded an independent
legal status under the antitrust laws, in a particular case the court will
analyze it under the identical legal standard they apply to the horizontal
restraint it generates. In this respect, group boycotts are treated no dif-
ferently from unilateral refusals to deal. 9 This statement, by implying
that in some situations concerted refusals to deal will be examined
under the Rule of Reason, seemingly contradicts the widely accepted an-
titrust precept that all group boycotts are per se illegal."0 To resolve
this apparent inconsistency, it is necessary to consider briefly the cases
from which this application of the per se rule springs.
B. Group Boycotts: Per Se Rule or Rule of Reason
Rules of law are often only clearly understood when the terms em-
bodied in them are defined. To state, for example, that grand theft is il-
" E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
' E.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1978); In Re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072
(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1979).
" E.g., National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961) (per curiam).
67 Group boycotts have often been viewed as establishing private govern-
ments. In Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), the Supreme Court, in referring to the Guild's complex system for battling
the piracy of clothing designs, stated: "The combination is in reality an extra-
governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of
interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and
punishment of violations." Id. at 465. See generally Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
" See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
69 See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
70 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 144 (1966); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658-60 (1961); Klor's,
1981]
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legal is to make a conclusory statement which takes on real meaning only
when one defines "grand theft." Similarly, it is necessary to come to an
understanding of what the courts mean by a group boycott when they
refer to it in terms of the per se rule.
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,1 the Supreme Covrt
stated: "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate
to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.""2 Alleged anticompetitive
conduct will be treated as a per se violation of the Sherman Act if two
criteria are met: 1) the practice, if effective, is likely in the wide major-
ity of cases to cause substantial anticompetitive harm; and 2) inquiry in-
to the practice's actual impact on competition is overly complex, costly
and time consuming, and likely in most instances to yield no definitive
results. 3 The plaintiff alleging a per se violation of the Sherman Act
may dispense with proof of the actual anticompetitive effects of the
restraint of trade. 4 The nature of the course of conduct, in and of itself,
gives rise to a presumption of unreasonableness.
In 1914, when the first major Supreme Court opinion dealing with a
group boycott was written, the Court was in the midst of ascertaining
the limits of its then recently enunciated Rule of Reason doctrine."5 In
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'Association v. United States, 7 a
group of retail lumber dealers entered into a conspiracy to prevent
wholesalers from selling their lumber directly to consumers. When a
member of the retail association learned that a wholesaler was selling
directly to its customers, it reported the name of the wholesaler to an of-
ficer of the association, who caused the name to be entered on a
blacklist.7 This list was distributed to the association's members, who
then refused to purchase from that wholesaler. 8
The defendants maintained that their course of conduct promoted
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959); Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612-13 (1914).
" 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7 Id. at 49-50. See also Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F.
Supp. 759, 764 (M.D. Pa.) rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
71 Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 764 (M.D. Pa.),
rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 70 (1977)). See generally Loutzenhiser, The
ERA Boycott and the Sherman Act, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 507, 516 (1980).
" Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978).
" The Rule of Reason doctrine had been announced in the 1911 decision of
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
76 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
1 Id. at 607.
7" Id. at 608-09.
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public welfare by guaranteeing access to local retail outlets."9 In reject-
ing this argument, the Court applied the per se rule, finding that the
association's practice was of such a character as to give rise to a
presumption that it had been entered into with the intent to restrain
the free flow of commerce." The Court went on to state:
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong
when done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the
form of a conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished, if the
result be hurtful to the public or to the individual against whom
the concerted action is directed."
Two anticompetitive "hurts" were identified by the Court. First, the
defendants were employing the threat of a boycott to horizontally ex-
clude wholesalers from competing on the retail level. Second, the under-
lying effect of the entire course of conduct was to maintain higher retail
prices for lumber goods."
Eastern States might be viewed as authoritatively establishing that
all group boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act. Yet in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,3 decided four years after
Eastern States, the Supreme Court applied the Rule of Reason to an
alleged anticompetitive course of conduct which included a primary
boycott.
The Chicago Board of Trade is a commodities exchange governed by a
set of regulations to which all members of the board subscribe. The
federal goverment sought to enjoin enforcement of the exchange's "call
rule," which prohibits member brokers from purchasing or offering to
purchase, during the period between the close of one session and the
opening of the next, at a price other than the closing price. 4 In effect,
the board entered into a primary boycott, threatening to refuse to deal
with any member who would not comply with the rule. 5 Since only
members can deal on the exchange, expulsion from the board would
severely restrict a broker's ability to conduct business.
7 Id. at 613.
Id. See generally Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 300 (1908).
81 Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added). Though there was no ac-
tual evidence of a conspiracy, the Court inferred its existence from the defend-
ants' actions in circulating the reports. Id. at 612.
82 Id.
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Id. at 237. The "call rule" controlled the sale of wheat, corn, oats and rye.
The defendants averred that the purpose of the rule was "to promote the conve-
nience of members by restricting their hours of business and to break up a
monopoly in that branch of the grain trade acquired by four or five
warehousemen in Chicago." Id.
'5 See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 210 (1976).
See generally notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text.
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All the indices of a concerted refusal to deal were present. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court held that the legality of the call rule was to
be tested by the Rule of Reason. Specifically, the Court dwelt on the
absence of evidence showing that the call rule limited the amount of
grain shipped, affected prices, discriminated against any party, or
resulted in hardship to anyone." It set forth a list of factors to be con-
sidered in determining the legality of a restraint, including: 1) the
nature of the business on which the restraint operates; 2) the actual im-
pact of the restraint on the business; 3) the nature of the restriction
itself; 4) the history of the restraint; 5) the reason for adopting it; and 6)
the end attained by it. 7 Applying these criteria, the Court found that
the exchange's conduct was reasonable because it affected only a small
portion of the commodities traded and had the overall effect of improv-
ing market conditions.8
At first impression, the tact used by the Chicago Board of Trade
Court clashes with the approach taken in Eastern States. While in
Eastern States the Supreme Court refused to analyze the an-
ticompetitive impact of the group boycott, holding it a per se violation
of the Sherman Act, the same Court, in Chicago Board of Trade, con-
sidered the lack of actual anticompetitive harm in finding the
exchange's practice, which included a primary group boycott,
reasonable. It would seem these two cases are diametrically opposed.
However, these cases can be reconciled if it is realized that the true
test of a group boycott attacked under the Sherman Act is whether it is
being used to enforce an otherwise anticompetitive practice.8 In
Eastern States, the boycott was employed to horizontally exclude com-
petitors and as a collusive device for maintaining high lumber prices.
Because horizontal exclusion and price fixing are substantive violations of
the Sherman Act,8 the boycott used to enforce them was deemed per se
illegal. In Chicago Board of Trade, where the exchange's practice was
246 U.S. at 238.
8 The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint,
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the pur-
pose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id.
Id. at 240.
See note 85 supra.
'0 See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying ar-
rangement as horizontal exclusion); United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co.,
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found not to be contrary to the policy of the antitrust laws, the boycott
was overlooked. Thus, in these types of cases, the courts explore beyond
the boycott's external shell to identify any substantive violations of the
Sherman Act for which the concerted refusal to deal is only a means of
implementation."
The Supreme Court's staunch statement of the per se doctrine in
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.," can also be explained via this
theory. In Klor's, a chain of department stores used a secondary boycott
in attempting to drive a small retail competitor out of business. The
defendant used its economic power to coerce ten national manufacturers
into refusing to deal with the plaintiff. 3 In striking down this practice,
the Court stated: "[Tihere [are] classes of restraints which from their
,nature or character' [are] unduly restrictive and hence forbidden by
both the common law and the statute .... Group boycotts, or concerted
refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be
in the forbidden category."9 ' Thus, according to the Klor's Court, all
group boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act.
The apparent difference between this statement of the law and the
theory set out above is actually a semantics problem revolving around
the word "group boycott." When in Klor's the Supreme Court used the
term "group boycott," it was referring only to those situations in which
a group of traders at one level attempt to prevent nongroup members
from competing at that level. It was concerned with the exercise of
monopoly power," and it focused on the business nature of the
353 U.S. 586 (1957) (vertical integration as horizontal exclusion); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing per se illegal); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price fixing).
"' This approach can also be seen in the Supreme Court case of Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
In that case the defendant manufacturers combined to force retailers to refrain
from selling copies of their original creations. The Guild boycotted those retailers
who continued to sell the copies, and hired investigators to detect violators. Id. at
461-62. The Court identified the practice as horizontal exclusion having "as its
purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition from the sale of
unregistered textiles and copies designs." Id. at 465. Based on this finding the
Court found the boycott in violation of the Sherman Act. See generally Com-
ment, Antitrust: Political Activity Immune from Sherman Act, 20 WASHBURN
L.J. 130, 133 (1980).
92 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
" Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 211-12 (emphasis added).
" See emphasized portion of text accompanying note 94 supra; Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Protest Boycotts,
supra note 27, at 1151.
" See emphasized portion of text accompanying note 94 supra; Smith v. Pro
,nature' and 'character,' a 'monopolistic tendency.' . . . Monopoly can as surely
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Broadway-Hale boycott and its anticompetitive objective." Hence, the
Court in Klor's essentially defined a group boycott as a concerted
refusal to deal employed to enforce an anticompetitive practice, and
then used that term, so defined, in its application of the per se rule. In
the end, attention is still directed to the issue of whether the boycott
promotes an otherwise anticompetitive act.98
III. RECENT PROTEST BOYCOTT CASES
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.," the defendant-railroads hired a public relations firm to conduct ac-
tivities aimed at influencing legislators to adopt and retain laws
destructive of the trucking industry. 0 In reversing the trial court's
judgment enjoining this practice, the Supreme Court stated:
[N]o violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere
attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws....
[Tihe Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by
driving them out in large groups." 359 U.S. at 213.
' Several lower federal courts have recently limited the Supreme Court's
language in this fashion. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Moham-
mad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564
F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Hatly v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646
(5th Cir. 1977); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123,
1130 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). See generally McCormick, Group Boycott-Per Se or Not
Per Se, That is the Question, 7 SET. HALL L. REV. 703 (1976).
" Several Judges and commentators have suggested that if the purpose
behind the boycott is noncommercial, i.e., unrelated to the production of business
profit, it should be presumed to be legal. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as
a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 705 (1962). See also Council for
Employment and Economic Energy Use v. WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); see generally Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940). This proposition differs from the one supported here in two
regards: 1) it is based, at least in part, on what the boycotter perceives as the ob-
jective of the boycott, whereas the test herein relies on an objective analysis of
anticompetitive impact; and 2) it is couched as an implied exclusion from the an-
titrust laws which presumes the illegality of the group boycott, while the test ad-
vocated here goes to the threshold determination of whether in fact the boycott
is a violation. The noncommercial purpose exclusion has been attacked as incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decision in National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See Protest Boycotts, supra note
27, at 1155.
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Id. at 129-30.
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the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that
would produce a restraint or a monopoly."1
Four years later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington," the Court
extended the scope of the Noerr exemption, holding: "Joint efforts to in-
fluence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though in-
tended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either
standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act." ' 3 This holding and the Noerr statement have been syn-
thesized into a rule of law known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine." 4
Subsequent cases have indicated that the Noerr-Pennington antitrust
exemption is predicated on the first amendment.' 5 Given this basis, it
comes as no surprise that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has often been
used as a defense in protest boycott litigation.' Yet several questions
remain to be answered, including: "Does the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
really apply to protest boycotts?" and perhaps more basic, "If analyzed
correctly do protest boycotts require the protection of an antitrust ex-
emption at all?" Before answering these questions it is necessary to ex-
amine two recent protest boycott cases.
A. The Crown Central Petroleum Case
In the three day period from July 13 to July 15, 1979, members of the
101 Id. at 135-36. The Court's conclusion was a natural extension of its earlier
holding in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In that case, the Supreme Court
declared that the Sherman Act does not apply to restraints of trade that proceed
from valid governmental action. Id. at 352. It necessarily follows that petitioning
the state to take such action must also be legitimate. See In re Airport Car Ren-
tal Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1979).
12 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
" Id. at 670. The plaintiffs in Pennington had alleged that the United Mine
Workers Union was attempting to eliminate smaller coal mining companies by in-
fluencing the Secretary of Labor. Id.
" For a comprehensive article dealing with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
see Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action:
The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80
(1977).
10" See, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399-400
(1978); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-15
(1972); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-08
(1962); Subscription T.V. v. Southern California Theatre Owners, 576 F.2d 230,
233 (9th Cir. 1978).
10 Recently, this has been especially true. See, e.g., Missouri v. Nat'l
Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980); Council for Employment and Economic Energy Use v. WHDH Corp., 580
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-
Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980); Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on pro-
cedural grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
19811
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
Pennsylvania-Delaware Service Station Dealers Association (Dealers
Association)' 7 closed their gasoline pumps to bring public pressure to
bear on the Department of Energy (DOE) in support of raising the max-
imum price at which gasoline could be sold. Several days later, the DOE
increased the maximum retail price of gasoline.'8 Two separate legal ac-
tions were brought in response to this course of conduct.
In Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman,'°9 the parent company
of one of the dealers who had participated in the shutdown sought a per-
manent injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act,"' seeking to en-
join the defendant Waldman from taking part in any future protest
closures."' Specifically, the plaintiff sought to prevent potentially ir-
reparable damage to its trademark resulting from Waldman's continu-
ing involvement in the Dealer's Association."2 It alleged that the defend-
ant had joined in the planning and execution of a secondary group
boycott in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act."3
The defendant Waldman argued that the protest boycott was an ex-
pression of his first amendment right to petition the government for a
redress of grievances. The defendant's argument was that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protects "concerted activity by a commercial
association to influence the government to pass and enforce laws and
regulations that may help that association's member and injure com-
petitors or consumers.""..4 Fundamentally, Waldman's defense was that
his actions came within an exception to the federal antitrust laws.
'" The association was formed by a group of independent dealers and did not
involve company-owned stations.
See 10 C.F.R. § 212.93 (1979).
486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on procedural grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d
Cir. 1980).
10 Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief .... against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws .... when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will
cause loss or damage is granted by courts or equity, under the rules
governing such proceedings.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
.. 486 F. Supp. at 761. The plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment that it
had properly terminated Waldman's franchise agreement and was entitled to
possession of his station. Id.
"' Id. at 762. The gist of plaintiffs complaint was that the good reputation of
its company stations had been damaged by the actions of the independent
dealers.
", Id. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
"1 486 F. Supp. at 763. The defendant also argued that since Crown Central
was not the "target" of the boycott, it had no standing to assert the antitrust
violation. This argument was summarily rejected by the court. Id.
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The Pennsylvania district court began by considering whether to test
the protest boycott under the Rule of Reason or to classify it as a per se
violation. It concluded that all activities popularly referred to as
boycotts are not per se offenses: The per se doctrine should only be ap-
plied to concerted refusals designed to "drive out competitors or to
keep them out, but not those in which the concerted action is designed
to achieve some other goal.." Thus, the protest boycott was to be
tested under the Rule of Reason. However, the court notably avoided
determining whether the protest boycott was a reasonable restraint of
trade, opting instead to consider whether the activities in question were
exempted from the antitrust laws by the first amendment."6
The court recognized that the Noerr doctrine was limited to situa-
tions where the course of conduct comprised mere solicitation of
governmental action."' As a result, the central issue of the case became
whether the dealers' refusal to deal was conduct protected as political
speech."' If the closings were political speech aimed at petitioning the
government, they could be protected under the Noerr doctrine. To make
this determination the court applied a test originally formulated in the
Supreme Court decision of Spence v. Washington."9
Under the Spence test, conduct is protected if: 1) it is a clear depar-
ture from the actor's normal conduct that can be explained only as an at-
tempt by him to express himself; 2) the actor reasonably believes that
the observers of his conduct will view his actions as expressive; and 3)
the actor intends to and does communicate.'20 Applying these criteria to
the station closings, the district court found that the dealers' actions
were a departure from their normal operation, that the public was well-
informed that the conduct was taken to protest the low maximum sale
price of gasoline, and that the dealers obviously intended to com-
", Id. at 764.
", "Whether the activities in question were unreasonable concerted actions in
restraint of trade, however, is unimportant in our final deliberation. Not every
form of combination or conspiracy that restrains trade falls within the ambit of
the Sherman Act's protections." Id. at 765.
." Id. at 766. See Eastern President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
"' This approach differs from the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1980). In that case the State of Missouri alleged that NOW's campaign to per-
suade organizations to boycott the convention industries of states which had not
ratified the Equal Rights Amendment constituted a restraint of trade. The NOW
court assumed that the campaign was a valid exercise of first amendment rights,
and spent much of its time determining whether, completely aside from Noerr,
the actions should be exempted as beyond the scope of the antitrust laws. Id. at
1315-16.
,, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
"" Id. at 409-11. See Crown Cent., 486 F. Supp. at 767.
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municate their frustration by the shutdown.12 The Court thereby con-
cluded that the dealers' actions were protected conduct.
As a final step, the court used the balancing test of United States v.
O'Brien"' to ascertain whether the dealers' interest in free expression
outweighed the government's interest in free trade and unrestrained
competition.'23 The district court noted that the dealers' ability to effec-
tively express themselves would be severely inhibited if the boycott
was not exempted. Relying heavily on this, the court resolved the
balance in favor of the association, and held that Waldman's actions
were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.'24
B. The Osborn Case
Six months after Crown, the District Court for the District of
Delaware, deciding a case based on the exact same factual situation
analyzed by the Pennsylvania district court, held that the independent
dealers' boycott was not protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In
Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Service Station Dealers
Association,' the plaintiff was not an oil company, but a consumer who
brought a class action on behalf of all those who regularly purchased
gasoline from one or more of the boycotting dealers. 2 '
The plaintiff averred that the Dealers Association's concerted refusal
to deal with consumers violated both the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act. In response, the dealers employed the same defense that had been
used successfully in Crown, namely that the protest boycott was
protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine."' As had the court in
Crown, the Delaware court initially distinguished between expressive
speech and expressive conduct, promptly placing the dealer's protest
boycott in the latter category. 8 Having made this classification, the
I"' Crown Cent., 486 F. Supp. at 768.
12 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"' 486 F. Supp. at 769. Under O'Brien, government regulation of political con-
duct is permitted if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the in-
cidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
"2 486 F. Supp. at 769.
"' 499 F. Supp. at 553 (D. Del. 1980).
" Id. at 555. Under certain circumstances, consumers have standing to sue
under the antitrust laws despite their lack of commercial interest. Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
" 499 F. Supp. at 556.
" Id. at 557.
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court went on to apply the balancing test mandated by United States v.
O'Brien.'29 At this point in the analysis the similarities with Crown end.
The court interpreted O'Brien as sanctioning government regulation
"aimed at the non-communicative impact of expressive conduct," as long
as the stated purpose justified the "incidental constriction of the flow of
ideas."'' ° The Noerr-Pennington doctrine was distinguished as having
dealt with the regulation of ideas, and not with the regulation of coer-
cive conduct. 3' The court went on to state that:
The free speech case law suggests that the refusal of the
Supreme Court to apply the antitrust laws in Noerr will not be
considered controlling in a context where the effect of the ap-
plication of those laws would be content neutral, would not
materially inhibit effective expression, and would alleviate the
coercive economic impact of a concerted refusal to deal.1
3
1
In the district court's opinion, a protest boycott, along with its ex-
pressive component, generates an anticompetitive impact which or-
dinarily may be subjected to regulation without jeopardizing first
amendment interests.
The court, recognizing the strong governmental interest in regulating
anticompetitive activity,"8 placed on the defendants the burden of show-
ing that the application of the antitrust laws to their protest boycott
would substantially impair their ability to be heard. 3' In other words,
the defendants' actions would not be exempted unless they could show
129 Id.
130 Id. The court quoted the following passage from United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968):
[W]hen speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms so long as that interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression.
Id. at 376-77.
'' 499 F. Supp. at 553, 557. According to the court, liability could not have
been imposed in Noerr, unless based on the anticompetitive nature of the
message conveyed. This would have been impermissible under O'Brien Id.
32 Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 558 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980)).
Conceivably, there may be situations in which application of those
acts to such a boycott would substantially impair the participants' abil-
ity to be heard, but this possibility does not require an across-the-board
antitrust immunity and nothing currently in the record suggests that
this is such a situation.
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that there was no less coercive alternative form of effective communica-
tion. In this case, the Delaware court deemed that this burden had not
been met,13 and refused to dismiss the claim against the Dealers
Association."'
The Crown and Osborn courts applied essentially the same test to the
same evidence and arrived at completely different results. This anomaly
can be traced to the courts' discordant views on how much weight to
give each of the interests weighed in the O'Brien test. The Crown court
struck the balance in favor of first amendment interests, while the
Osborn court, emphasizing the coercive nature of the protest boycott,
placed greater weight with the regulatory interests. These incongruous
results do more than just imply that one of the courts erred in its ap-
plication of the balancing test; they strongly indicate that the legal stan-
dard employed by both benches was inappropriate.
IV. CRITIQUE
As exemplified by Crown and Osborn, the judiciary's approach to the
protest boycott problem has two major flaws. First, it relies heavily on
a balancing test which allows judges to arbitrarily assign values to the
regulatory and first amendment interests being weighed, and which pro-
duces decisions having little precedential value. Second, and more im-
portantly, it incorrectly presumes, as a first principle, that all protest
boycotts are illegal, and consequently in many instances goes on to
develop unnecessary and unwarranted extensions of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. Each of these criticisms will be dealt with in-
dividually.
A. Arbitrary Standards
By their very nature, protest boycotts are volatile. They are directed
at controversial issues,137 often employed by unpopular or scorned
1"5 In Crown, the Pennsylvania district court had come to the exact opposite
conclusion:
It might reasonably be that the only means of effective expression was
the boycott. For us to hold that [the dealers] must have continued to rely
upon strictly written and oral communication would be to deny them
what may have been their only effective means of communica-
tion-arousing public sentiment. This we will not do.
486 F. Supp. at 769.
13a 499 F. Supp. at 558. The court dismissed the actions against the federal of-
ficials, advising the plaintiff to seek his remedy under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
"7 E.g., Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (passage of the Equal Rights Amendment);
Allied Int'l Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980)
(protesting Russian invasion of Afghanistan).
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groups,"8 and frequently support social principles which run counter to
the then accepted norms of society."3 ' They cause economic injury, and
do so to extract often unquantifiable benefits. They are designed to
generate support for a cause, but recurrently have the effect of creating
negative public opinion.
Given the provocative nature of protest boycotts, it is unfortunate
that the test used for determining their legality depends largely on the
ideological sympathies of a particular bench. Within the confines of the
O'Brien test a court must make three value judgments: 1) it must place
a value on the government's interest in free trade and unrestrained
competition; 2) it must estimate the defendant's interest in free expres-
sion; and 3) it must juxtapose these interests and determine which is
weightier in a given set of circumstances.14 While it is conceivable that
these judgments can be made with perfect objectivity, it is more likely
that courts will be swayed by the content of the message
communicated.' Depending on the court's views, this type of subtle
bias can affect adversely either the boycotter or the boycotted.
The O'Brien test, especially as used in Osborn, is essentially a cost-
benefit analysis.142 The Osborn court required the defendant to show
that the boycott was the least coercive effective means of expression."
At a minimum this would require evidence that the benefits obtained
through the boycott in terms of effective communication outweigh the
costs to competition." The latter factor is easily quantified for it can be
based loosely on the damages incurred by the economic actors who were
boycotted.145 However, the benefit side of the equation is most likely un-
13 A prominent example would be the protest boycotts employed by black
citizens of Montgomery, Alabama in the late 1950's and 1960's. See Silbey, Direct
Action and the Struggle for Integration, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 351 (1965); Coons, Non-
Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 705, 705 n.2
(1962).
13 An example is the boycott by homosexuals of citrus products to protest
against the Miami, Florida gay rights referendum. See also Missouri v. Nat'l
Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d at 1304 n.5.
140 See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. at 768-69.
141 See Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 659, 662 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Political Boycott Activity].
141 See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
143 Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp.
at 558.
144 See 1 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 201-05 (1978) (Behavior "unnecessarily
harmful" to competition when it is excessively dangerous without being indispen-
sible to the political activity).
145 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), requires an antitrust
plaintiff to demonstrate that he has been injured in his business or property. See
also note 126 supra.
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quantifiable. Thus, the formula itself is skewed in favor of the antitrust
plaintiff. Defendants who have inflicted great economic injury on the
target will be hard pressed to show that their boycott was the least
coercive effective means of expression. 4 '
A further criticism of the balancing approach is that it does not lend
itself to the establishment of precedent. In an area of the law where
potential liability is massive due to the looming presence of treble
damages,"7 there is a controlling need to assure consistent evaluation of
analogous claims. " 8 As the conflicting holdings of Crown and Osborn il-
lustrate, the O'Brien test, so dependent on value judgments colored by
the socio-economic policies of a particular court, does not fulfill this
need." 9 This absence of legal guidelines affects both the potential
boycotter's ability to evaluate the legal ramifications of his anticipated
conduct and the capacity of the antitrust laws to deter future illegal ac-
tivity.
Faced with enormous possible liability, the potential boycotter has
the impossible task of determining what balance a court might strike in
the future.' No doubt this lack of knowledge will cause some organiza-
tions to eschew protest boycotts as a means of expression. In addition,
still other organizations will enter into anticompetitive conduct, either
with a hope that the courts will strike the balance in their favor, or in
ignorance of the truly anticompetitive nature of the actions they are
undertaking. In either situation the policies of the antitrust laws will be
undercut.
B. The Presumption of Illegality
The ultimate defect in the judiciary's approach to protest boycott
cases lies not in the ambiguous standard used to determine whether the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applicable, but rather in its presumption
that an affirmative defense is necessary at all. Before an affirmative
1,8 For example, a coalition of union leaders and church groups might be faced
with a showing that their boycott activity had caused several million dollars of
damages to an agricultural combine, and be required to demonstrate that they
could not have effectively communicated their message by advertising instead of
a boycott.
"I Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), states that an injured
party "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. See Protest Boycotts, supra note 27, at
682, for an argument that treble damages should not be recoverable in protest
boycott actions. This approach attempts to remedy one of the inadequacies in the
balancing approach while leaving the test intact. It treats a symptom, but not the
illness.
"I See Missouri v. Nat'l Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d at 1320 (Gib-
son, J., dissenting).
"' See Part IV.
15 See Political Boycott Activity, supra note 141, at 662.
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defense need come into play, it must be first found that the protest
boycott is anticompetitive. The present approach glosses over this
threshold issue and immediately proceeds to consider whether the
boycott is protected under the first amendment.' This methodology ef-
fectively rearranges the burdens of proof, and provides a fertile medium
for unnecessary extensions of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
All protest boycotts are not illegal. Whether they be a unilateral
refusal to deal or a primary or secondary boycott, they should be tested
by the same standard used to evaluate all other types of refusals to
deal, that is, whether the refusal is employed to enforce an otherwise
anticompetitive course of conduct. 2 In most cases, the protest boycott
is not used as an enforcement mechanism in an anticompetitive scheme.
Thus, it should be sanctioned, not because it is protected by the first
amendment, but because it does not violate the policies of the antitrust
laws.153 This inquiry should be the starting point in all protest boycott
cases.
An approach analagous to that suggested here was utilized by the
District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Allied International,
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO. 4 In Allied,
the Longshoremen's Union refused to load and unload ships engaged in
trade with the U.S.S.R. to protest the Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan. 55 The action was brought by an importer of Soviet wood
products who alleged that the longshoremen had planned and executed
a group boycott. In dismissing this claim, the Massachusetts court made
passing reference to Noerr, but based its decision on a finding that the
union members had not imposed a restraint of trade.'56 Thus, the district
court focused on whether the refusal to deal violated the antitrust laws,
'6' In Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.),
rev'd on procedural grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980), the court did initially
consider whether the boycott was unreasonable, but abandoned that inquiry in
favor of examining whether the boycott was protected. Id. at 765. See note 116
supra and accompanying text. See generally Allied Int'l., Inc. v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980).
152 See notes 33-37, 46-53, 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
1 As Posner has stated:
A boycott is simply a method of self-help enforcement. It can be used by
firms to enforce a cartel, in which event it is bad because cartels are bad;
but it can equally well be used, and often is, by firms or individuals to
enforce a code of truthful advertising, to minimize credit risk, or to ex-
press opposition to communism, or racial discrimination, or the use of
nonunion labor.
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207 (1976).
'1 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980) (action consolidated with Walsh v. Int'l
Organization Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980)).
' 492 F. Supp. at 335-36.
" Id. at 339.
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and in answering this question in the negative, found it unnecessary to
rule on any affirmative defenses.57
Unlike the Allied court, most courts concentrate on the issue of
whether the boycotter's actions are protected by an affirmative defense.
The practical implication of such an approach is to always place the
burden of proof on the defendants. As presently staged, in a protest
boycott case the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the
defendants engaged in a refusal to deal.' 58 At this point the burden
shifts to the defendants to show that their action is exempted from an-
titrust scrutiny, usually under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This proof
problem is then compounded by the demands placed on the defendant
by the O'Brien test."9
Under the proposed approach the plaintiff should be required to not
only show that the defendants refused to deal, but that the refusal was
used to enforce an otherwise anticompetitive course of conduct. If he
proffers such proof, then the burden should shift to the defendants to
prove that their conduct was protected.
However, the negative impacts flowing from the judiciary's presump-
tion of illegality are not felt only by antitrust defendants, for in attempt-
ing to reach an equitable result in these cases many courts have en-
larged the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This extension af-
fects antitrust plaintiffs by giving their opponents an escape, and
thereby generally undercuts the efficacy and comprehensiveness of the
regulatory system. It is contrary to the prevailing policy of limiting as
much as possible the coverage of antitrust exemptions,' and is of ques-
tionable legal validity.' In addition, the extension is not really
' Cf. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd inpart, rev'd in part, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978) (court look-
ed to nature of doctor's boycott of abortion clinic).
1 See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
159 See notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text.
10 The 1979 National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Pro-
cedures, Report to the President and the Attorney General, states:
1. Free market competition, protected by the antitrust laws, should
continue to be the general organizing principle....
2. Exceptions should only be made where there is compelling evidence
of the unworkability of competition or a clearly paramount social
purpose.
Id. at 177. See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 398 (1978).
"11 Some commentators have contended, perhaps correctly, that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine should be applied only in situations where a defendant's
course of conduct is directed towards influencing a governmental official to take
an anticompetitive action, and not where the defendant engages in an-
ticompetitive activity to procure governmental action which is itself legal. See
Loutzenhiser, The ERA Boycott and the Sherman Act, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 507, 515
(1980).
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necessary. In many instances where it is applied, the defendant's
boycott is not being availed of to enforce an anticompetitive course of
conduct, and thus is not illegal to begin with.' 2
Before referring to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, courts should first
decide whether a protest boycott violates the Sherman Act. The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine should not be extended by holdings which would
qualify as dicta if the court had gone so far as to analyze the an-
ticompetitive nature of the defendant's conduct.' 3 Cases such as Crown
and Osborn should be decided using antitrust principles, and unless dic-
tated by the exigencies of particular facts, should be adjudicated
without reference to implied exceptions based in other areas of the law.
Courts should be wary of needlessly enlarging the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, for if the doctrine is further expanded, the antitrust laws may
become exceptions to the first amendment instead of the reverse situa-
tion.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is some tension between the protections afforded by the first
amendment and the policies of the antitrust laws, but not nearly as
much as most courts would have us believe. An apparent conflict is
created when courts incorrectly presume that all protest boycotts are il-
legal, and then set about to derive implied exemptions for these al-
legedly violative actions. Under this methodology a boycott defendant is
strapped with additional unnecessary pressures, which in turn
discourage the potential utilization of protest boycotts as a means of ex-
pression.
The judiciary's present approach to the protest boycott problem has
two major flaws. First, its use of the O'Brien test subjects the antitrust
defendant to the ideological sympathies of a particular bench, and places
on the boycotter the burden of showing that the concerted refusal to
deal was the least coercive effective means of expression. It is ironic
that the more successful the protest boycott is in terms of generating
economic injury to influence change, the heavier the burden placed on
the defendants.
162 See notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
16 With the exception of protest boycott cases, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
has been limited in the past several years. For example, it is now commonly ac-
cepted that the doctrine does not apply to attempts to influence purely commer-
cial functions of government. See Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), on remand, 376 F.
Supp. 125 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975). See generally Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Fischel,
Antitrust Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45
CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977).
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Second, the present methodology is defective because it ignores the
central issue, namely, whether the protest boycott is an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Absent a finding of unreasonableness, no implied ex-
emption is necessary. The present approach shifts the burden of proof
to the defendant, who must demonstrate affirmatively that his actions
are protected by the first amendment. In most cases such a shift is un-
warranted. The approach also sets the stage for unnecessary extensions
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine since courts, sensitive to the underly-
ing equities of a case, will look to the first amendment as a means of ab-
solving the defendants from liability.
To correct these flaws this Article proposes a three-step standard.
First, courts should classify the protest boycott as either a unilateral
refusal to deal, a primary boycott or a secondary boycott. Second, they
should determine whether the boycott is being used to enforce an other-
wise anticompetitive course of conduct. The first step's classification
will aid in this determination, as each of the types of refusals to deal
lend themselves to certain categories of anticompetitive conduct. Third,
only if the boycott is deemed anticompetitive should the courts look to
implied exceptions. In this approach, the burden would remain on the
plaintiff to show that the protest boycott was an unreasonable restraint
of trade.
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